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Court Polarization: A Comparative
Perspective
IDDO PORAT*

ABSTRACT
Polarization is on the rise around the globe. Political views are driven
to the poles, and moderate views are weakened. Many studies have been carried out on the increase in social and political polarization, but far fewer on
the effects of polarization on constitutional and supreme courts, and none on
a comparative or global scale. This Article attempts to fill this gap. It aims,
for the first time, to describe and typologize the effects of political polarization on constitutional and supreme courts in different parts of the world.
The Article identifies three models of such effects: mirror polarization
(the U.S.) - in which the court mirrors the political division in society; onesided polarization (the UK and Westminster model countries) - in which the
court reflects one side of the political divide more than the other; and cracks
in consensus-based nomination processes (Continental Europe) - in which
the rise of fringe parties is challenging the consensus-based nomination of
constitutional judges.
The Article concludes that Westminster model countries are shifting
from one-sided to mirror court polarization, while the U.S. is witnessing a
shift in the opposite direction – from mirror to one-side polarization. Except
for recent cases, Europe’s constitutional courts are surprisingly immune
from the effects of polarization.
For the U.S. – currently experiencing one of the most severe crises in
the history of its Court – this study could provide an important comparative
perspective and possible examples for emulation. For non-U.S. audiences, it
* Associate Professor of Law at the College of Law and Business, Israel. I would like to
thank Michaela Hailbronner, Christoph Krenn, David Landau, Niels Petersen, Andrea Pin,
Scott Stephenson, Mark Tushnet, Sergio Verdugo, and the participants of the 2021 Global
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the Court Panel. I would especially like to thank Moshe Cohen Eliay for his helpful comments and suggestions and Yehuda Porat for his excellent editing.
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can provide a way of comparing one’s system to the extreme level of court
polarization in the U.S. and situating it to other systems.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, there has been a global trend of polarization in
politics.1 Political views tend to be driven to the poles, and moderate views
tend to be weakened. Political parties that were once considered small fringe
parties gain traction, and leaders of the traditional parties tend to adopt more
extreme views.2 Political affiliation becomes tribal - it becomes part of one’s
identity, as does one’s animosity towards the opposing political party. Tribalism strengthens extremism, as it diminishes a sense of solidarity and develops a “we” and “they” dichotomy. The stakes of the other side winning
become higher, and losing to the other side threatens one’s core identity, set
of beliefs, and ways of life. Consequently, there are fewer possibilities for
compromise and consensus, and a religious-like mentality of uncompromised principles takes hold.3
The U.S. may be one of the most extreme examples of political polarization.4 Polls show that in the U.S., people view political polarization as the
most pressing issue in U.S. politics, and comparisons between the current
level of political divisiveness and that which existed prior to the American
Civil War are not uncommon.5 Trump’s presidency may have presented a
1. THOMAS CAROTHERS & ANDREW O’DONOHUE (EDS.), DEMOCRACIES DIVIDED: THE
GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION (Brookings Institution Press, 2019);
Thomas Carothers & Andrew O’Donohue, How to Understand the Global Spread of Political
Polarization, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Oct. 1, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/01/how-to-understand-global-spread-of-political-polarization-pub-79893
(“Polarization is tearing at the seams of democracies around the world, from Brazil and India
to Poland and Turkey. It isn’t just an American illness; it’s a global one.”).
2. See, e.g., Dubravka Zarkov, Populism, Polarization and Social Justice Activism, 24
EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 197 (2017) (criticizing the rise of right-wing fringe parties in the UK
and in Continental Europe); George Eaton, Corbynism 2.0: The Radical Ideas Shaping Labour’s Future, 147 NEW STATESMAN, https://www.newstatesman.com/uncategorized/2018/09/corbynism-20-radical-ideas-shaping-labour-s-future (last updated Sept. 12,
2021) (criticizing the extremism of the Labor Party under Corbin).
3. See Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2014)
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-americanpublic/ (finding that in 2014, 27% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans believed that the
other party is “a threat to the nation’s well-being” - double the numbers from 1994).
4. Levi Boxell, Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26669, 2020),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26669 (“We measure trends in affective polarization in nine
OECD countries over the past four decades. The U.S. experienced the largest increase in polarization over this period.”).
5. Laura Paisley, Political Polarization at its Worst Since the Civil War, USC NEWS
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://news.usc.edu/110124/political-polarization-at-its-worst-since-thecivil-war-2/ (“the NOMINATE data generated by James Lo and his co-authors shows that
partisan elites in the U.S. are as polarized today as they were around the time of the Civil
War.”).
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certain peak in U.S. polarization, but polarization will likely not go away
with the change of administration, as it is a deep-seated and long-term trend
that does not depend solely on the personality of one state leader or another.6
However, the U.S. is not alone in witnessing polarization in the global
sphere. Brexit has brought to new heights political polarization in the UK.7
In Western Europe, the great waves of immigration and the rise of nationalism and tensions within the EU following the economic Euro crisis have
strengthened both the extreme right and the extreme left parties and weakened the traditional central parties.8 A rise in polarization has been identified
in many other parts of the world as well.9
The recent increase in social and political polarization has been studied
by many researchers, including in comparative terms.10 There are, however,
much fewer studies on the effects of polarization on constitutional and supreme or high courts (henceforth “apex courts” or “the courts”)11 and no attempt as of yet to map the effects of polarization on apex courts in a global
or comparative context. The purpose of this Article would be to fill this gap.
This Article will map the effects of polarization on apex courts in different
parts of the world and suggest an initial typology of such effects into three
models. The models are mirror-polarization, one-sided polarization, and
cracks in consensus-based nomination processes.
By mirror-polarization, I mean the fact that polarization in society is
replicated directly in the court. This is the case in the U.S., where the Supreme Court (used to be) divided roughly in a way that represented the political division in the country between liberals and conservatives. The U.S.
6. See, e.g., Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA, 15, 17 (Nathan Persily ed.,
2015) (Showing that polarization trends much predate the Trump administration. “Since the
1970s, however, there has been a steady and steep increase in the polarization of both the
House and Senate. Other measures of party conflict confirm the trend of increasing polarization in the past 40 years.”).
7. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 1; See e.g., examples of increased polarization in countries as diverse
as Australia, Hungary, and Canada: Luke Mansillo and Nick Evershed, Australian Politics
Becoming More Polarised, THE GUARDIAN (Aug 7, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/aug/07/australian-politics-becoming-more-polarised;
Emilia
Palonen, Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary,
62 PARLIAMENTARY
AFF.
318
(2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/aug/07/australian-politics-becoming-more-polarised (documenting polarization in
post-communist Hungary); Christian Paas-Lang, Canadians are Polarized, and Intense Party
Loyalty Could be to Blame: Study, GLOBAL NEWS (Sept. 12, 2019), https://globalnews.ca/news/5892865/canada-polarization-study/.
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. The U.S. is a notable exception. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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Supreme Court has always been more political than other similar courts
around the world. However, it was only due to the dramatic increase in social
and political polarization in the U.S., starting in the 1980s and intensifying
in the past two decades, that politics became partisan, and there began a clear
mirroring of the division between liberals and conservatives in society and
in the Supreme Court. I explain this development in terms of judicial decision-making as well as in terms of the nomination process.12 I conclude,
however, that due to the recent development in the makeup of the Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court may be in the process of shifting from mirror-polarization to my next model – one-sided polarization. I discuss the meaning of this
shift and how this framing of recent developments can help us understand
them.
By one-sided polarization, I mean the fact that, by and large, the judges
on the court reflect more closely one side of the political divide. The Westminster model or British-style parliamentary systems, such as in England,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Israel, reflect this model in varying
degrees, depending on the country. Since the 1980s, the model of the judiciary based on judicial deference, parliament sovereignty, and the tradition of
political constitutionalism that had dominated all these countries began eroding, and apex courts in these systems saw a clear integration of ideas of
global constitutionalism, including the adoption of proportionality, human
rights talk, judicial activism, and progressive liberalism. These processes
started partly for other reasons, but when political polarization deepened, the
association of the court with liberal and progressive ideas intensified,
amounting to what I call one-sided polarization. As polarization rose so did
the association of courts with liberal and progressive ideas, which led to political backlash from conservative circles.13 With regard to this model, I detect a recent shift in the opposite direction than in the U.S. Once right-wing
parties started nominating their own judges to the courts, Westminster-type
courts began having two opposing judicial camps in them – conservative and
liberal – as in the U.S. Although, still a long way from the intensity of U.S.
court polarization, the Westminster model can nevertheless be described as
shifting from a one-sided into a mirror polarization model.
The third model, cracks in consensus-based nomination processes, can
be seen in Continental Western Europe. Europe’s combination of a formalist
continental law culture, which creates a non-political perception of judges,
with the makeup of constitutional courts based on political consensus and
equal shares of different parties in the nominations, has managed to fend off

12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
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polarizing courts so far. However, as political polarization in Europe rises
and the traditional center parties weaken vis-a-vis more extreme parties, one
can identify some early signs of pressures on this system. One can see some
early signs of this evolution in Switzerland and Germany in particular.14
The typology, I suggest, offers several insights into the phenomena in
question. First, it highlights the importance of context and of institutional
and cultural differences when analyzing polarization, particularly its effects
on courts. In different countries and systems, a similar phenomenon that has
global effects – political polarization – may materialize very differently than
in other systems. Second, it offers a starting point for the hard work of trying
to alleviate judicial polarization (to the extent we see it as a problem). Coming to grips with and understanding this phenomenon is the key to tackling
it properly.
My paper is limited to certain countries and judicial systems and does
not cover countries in other parts of the world. The selection does follow a
certain logic – analyzing courts according to what many consider to be the
three main models of constitutional courts and judicial review – the U.S.
model, the British model, and the Continental European model.15 But, obviously, any selection on this scale is somewhat arbitrary, and this review suffers especially from the lack of Global South countries. Further work can
extend the models to other countries as well, according to their similarities
to one or more of the models I suggest here.
In Part I, I survey, define, and characterize the reasons for political polarization. I also distinguish it from related processes such as democratic
backsliding and ethnic polarization. In Parts II, III, and IV, I canvas the three
models, separating between the effects on the nomination of judges and on
judicial behavior. The Article ends with a conclusion.

14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See e.g., Albert H.Y. Chen, The Global Expansion of Constitutional Judicial Review:
Some Historical and Comparative Perspectives, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG FACULTY OF
LAW RESEARCH PAPER at 2-3 (2013) (distinguishing between the U.S. model, British ex-colonies, and Continental Europe); Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade, Comparative Constitutional
Law: Judicial Review, 3 J. CONST. L. 977, 979 (2001) (distinguishing between the UK (political constitutionalism) the U.S. (diffused judicial review) and Continental Europe (centralized
judicial review)).
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I. POLITICAL POLARIZATION
In politics, polarization occurs when political opinions diverge strongly
into opposing camps and middle-ground positions are weakened.16 Measuring political polarization is complex and may change according to the political system. Thus, in multiparty systems, such as Continental Europe, measuring polarization may mean measuring the rising power of fringe parties
and the reduced power of the center parties.17 On the other hand, in two-party
systems, such as the U.S. and the UK, measuring polarization may mean
measuring the growing power of the radical elements in each party, and the
diminishing overlap and mobility between the two parties.18 There are many
other variances in the types of measurements of polarization the political science literature; there is no clear agreement on the way to measure it.19 However, for the purpose of this Article, I rely on the widely shared (albeit not
unanimous) claim that in the past four decades, and especially in the past
decade, there has been an increase in political polarization in many parts of
the world. In the U.S., there is a very strong scholarly consensus that there
has been a sharp increase in polarization in recent decades.20 But, in Europe
also, a recent survey found that “with very few exception[s], polarization is
on the rise in every single Western European country.”21 Notably, “polarization has almost tripled to the point that in most countries, the election with
the highest level of polarization since the Second World War has taken place

16. Polarization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/polarization (“a state in which the opinions, beliefs, or interests of a group
or society no longer range along a continuum but become concentrated at opposing extremes.”).
17. Thus, in a recent survey measuring polarization in Europe the research measures the
percentage of votes for anti-political-establishment parties (APEp) in the last decade and
shows that it “has exponentially increased. And with it, the distance between political parties
and the irreconcilable differences (either ideological, personalistic, or both) among voters has
also increased.” Fernando C. Bértoa & José Rama, Polarization: What Do We Know and What
Can We Do About It?, 3 FRONTIERS IN POL. SCI. (June 30, 2021), https://www.frontiersin.org
/article/10.3389/fpos.2021.687695.
18. See infra text accompanying note 39.
19. See Aaron Bramson et. al., Understanding Polarization: Meanings, Measures, and
Model Evaluation, 84 PHIL. OF SCI. 115 (2017) (identifying at least 8 meanings for polarization which lead to 8 different ways to measure polarization); Paul DiMaggio, John Evans,
Bethany Bryson, Have American’s Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?, 102 AM. J.
SOCIO. 690 (1996), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/230995.
20. See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
21. Bértoa & Rama, supra note 17.
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in the last 10 years.” Additionally, studies documenting a rise in polarization
can be found in many other parts of the world.22
Polarization can be attributed to local reasons as well as global or crosscountry ones. Local reasons vary from one country to another, and I will
address some of those when I discuss the countries that are my primary examples. As to global or cross-country reasons, the literature on polarization
has discerned at least four distinct reasons for polarization: economic gaps,
nationalism, globalization, and changes in the media.
First, the incredible global rise in economic discrepancies between the
rich and poor since the 1980s has contributed to social alienation and polarization on a global scale.23 Second, right-wing sentiments of nationalism,
conservativism, and particularism have resurfaced in many countries and elevated polarization. In Europe, such sentiments were suppressed in the first
decades following WWII because of the reaction to the devastating effects
of nationalism and the continuation of the Cold War, which provided a common enemy and blocked localism and nationalism. As the effects of WWII
waned and the Cold War ended, these sentiments resurfaced. In addition,
they were fueled by developments in the early 2000s: global terrorism that
required tighter border controls, the waves of immigration in the mid2010s,24 and the economic downturn of the late 2000s.25 All these developments contributed to nationalist and extreme politics, including a backlash
against the progressive and cosmopolitan elite that dominated politics in the

22. See, e.g., Carothers & O’Donahue, supra note 1 (documenting the rise in polarization
in Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Poland, Turkey, and the United
States).
23. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)
(documenting the levels of inequality in income and in wealth mainly in the U.S. and in Europe since the 18th century and showing a sharp increase in inequality since the 1980s reaching at the time of publication the highest level since the late 1920s. It also warns of the social
dangers of such inequality including social alienation and polarization); See also infra note
44 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Danilo Di Mauro & Luca Verzichelli, Political Elites and Immigration in
Italy: Party Competition, Polarization and New Cleavages, 11 CONTEMP. ITALIAN POL. 401,
at 406 (2019) (empirically measuring polarization during the immigration crisis in Italy and
finding that “during the crisis period, parties of the opposition tended to assume more extreme
positions on the threats of immigration to the national economy, riding the wave of public
concern for a fragile economy still overshadowed by the Great Recession.”).
25. See generally JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS (2016) (documenting to the effects of the
late 2000s recession, as well as the waves of immigration in the 2010s on political extremis
and polarization); See also Bértoa & Rama, supra note 17, at 6 (“given the magnitude of the
2008 global financial and economic crisis, it is not surprising that the level of polarization
exponentially increased during the last decade, especially in those countries most affected by
the crisis (e.g., Spain, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy).”).
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Post-War decades.26 Third, the rise of a cosmopolitan professional global
elite that benefited from a globalized economy and was concentrated geographically mostly in cities, contributed to global polarization. It created a
gap between the new elite and local middle and lower classes in rural areas
that do not benefit from globalization and may even be hurt by it.27 The final
global reason for polarization is the changes in the media: cable TV and, the
rise of the internet and social media, which allowed for the creation of media
fragmentation, isolated communities who communicate solely between
themselves, and political echo chambers, enhancing extremism and polarization.28
Political polarization is related to two other phenomena that will not be
the center of my study – ethnic and religious polarization and populism. Societies polarized along ethnic or religious lines include: Belgium (Walloon
vs. Flemish), Spain (Catalans vs. Spanish, Basque vs. Spanish), Switzerland
(German, French and Italian), Canada (Anglophones vs. Francophones),
Northern Ireland (Catholic vs. Protestant), and Israel (Jews vs. Arabs).29 This
polarization sometimes coincides with political polarization and may contribute to it. However, the two are distinct issues and do not necessarily correlate for three reasons. First, whereas ethnic and religious polarization is a
constant feature of a society, political polarization is not constant and can
change dramatically over the years. Second, ethnic and religious polarization
is a local feature of a society, while political polarization is a global

26. See Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crises: Lipset,
Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage, 25 J. EUR. PUBLIC POL. 109 (2018) (arguing that
social division and the rise of right-wing fringe parties is a reaction of traditionally conservative sectors to the imposition of socially liberal values); Ronald Inglehart & Pippa Norris,
Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash (Harvard Kennedy University, Working Paper, Series 16-026, 2016) (“[T]he surge in votes for
populist parties can be explained not as a purely economic phenomenon but in large part as a
reaction against progressive cultural change.”).
27. See Inglehart & Norris, supra note 26. Rahsaan Maxwell, Geographic Divides and
Cosmopolitanism: Evidence from Switzerland, 53 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 2061, 2062 (2020)
(“highly educated professionals are more likely than people with less education and manual
occupations to have cosmopolitan pro-immigration and pro–European Union (EU) preferences.”); KUBLER, D. SCHEUSS ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF THE METROPOLIS 199 (J.
Seller et al. ed., 2013); Nial Cunningham & Mike Savage, An Intensifying and Elite City: New
Geographies of Social Class and Inequality in Contemporary London, 21 CITY 25 (2017).
28. See John V. Duca & Jason L. Saving, Income Inequality, Media Fragmentation, and
Increased Political Polarization, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 392, 404 (2016) (finding that
media fragmentation in the U.S. following the advance of cable TV and social media contributed more to U.S. polarization than income inequality).
29. See generally Marta Reynal-Querol, Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil War, 46
J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 29 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between ethnic and religious
divisions and civil wars).
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phenomenon driven partly by global reasons.30 Third, these two types of polarization affect courts differently. The representation of ethnic and religious
groups in courts has long been a feature of apex courts in many countries,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, and despite challenges and debates, many
consider this an integral and justified part of the judicial system. Political
representation, however, presents a different and more complex set of legitimacy challenges to a court and is much more hotly debated.31 Therefore, the
phenomena that I focus on are distinct from ethnic and religious polarization
which compel a separate analysis.
Political polarization should also be distinguished from populism. In
academic literature and public discourse, much attention has been given to
the rise of populism in many countries, especially in the second decade of
the 20th century.32 Populism, in this context, refers to the rise of parties and
ideologies that are averse to elites and espouse popular sentiments such as
anti-immigration or anti-minority, promote anti-globalization, and are characterized by strong and charismatic leaders.33 The election of Donald Trump
in the U.S., the Brexit movement in the UK, and the rise of the political right
in Europe are points in mind. Populism is also related to the democratic backsliding that occurred in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey.34
Unlike religious and ethnic polarization, populism does have strong
global or cross-country features and does coincide roughly with political polarization in terms of its timeline and reasons. However, the two are distinct,
and focus on different policies – the first concentrates on the political divide
in society and, therefore, assumes some democratic competition between the

30. For example, U.S political polarization was very low during the 1950s and 1960s, but
has risen dramatically since the 1980s. In contrast, Black and white polarization was very
high during the 1950s and the 1960s and is also a constant feature of American society.
31. In consociational political systems, such as Belgium, this arrangement is set in legislation. Whereas in other countries, like the U.S. and Israel, arrangements are set up in nomination custom (such as the representation of African-Americans, Jews and Catholics in the
U.S. Supreme Court); See generally Anita Böcker & Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, Ethnic
Minority Representation in the Judiciary: Diversity Among Judges in Old and New Countries
of Immigration, THE JUD. Q. (2007), https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/
Ethnic-representation-in-the-judiciary.pdf.
32. See generally BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM (Stanford University Press 2016); Nadia Urbinati, Democracy and Populism, 5 CONSTELLATIONS 110 (1998);
David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521 (2018).
33. See JAN WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (University of Pennsylvania Press
2016).
34. See generally Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy,
65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018).
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two political sides.35 In contrast, the second focuses on the attempt of one
side of the map to take over or weaken the democratic process.
With regard to the judiciary, populism and democratic backsliding studies concentrate on governmental attempts to capture the judiciary and
weaken the rule of law institutions, including constitutional courts, attorney
generals, ombudsmen, etc.36 Political pressure to change or intervene in the
rule of law institutions is a possible polarization effect. Political polarization
heightens political anxieties and stakes, creating pressure to influence all
centers of power, including the courts. Polarization, however, can also manifest itself in internal court processes, such as when the court is being polarized and divided clearly between the two opposing sides, without any change
in democratic rules, or when reform attempts are within the scope of legitimate democratic changes.37 I will, therefore, sometimes refer to populism
when describing polarization, especially when other sources do so,38 but I
wish to keep the two separated for the purposes of my discussion.

II. MIRROR POLARIZATION: THE UNITED STATES
Political polarization is an all-encompassing social phenomenon. It is,
therefore, not surprising that it can influence the way courts operate, especially when it comes to apex courts which bear the highest political profile.
However, the way polarization affects courts varies between different jurisdictions and political systems. Obviously, the extent to which a court is, either formally or informally, subject to political considerations or viewed as
a political actor (the level of court politicization) may affect the extent and
ways polarization affects it. Among the other factors that affect court polarization, one can list: the kind and intensity of the general polarization in society, the reasons for polarization, the constitutional culture, the institutional
design of the court, the way judges are elected, and more.
35. Polarization can still exist in semi-authoritarian regimes, that do not completely control the opposition, and even in authoritarian regimes. However social division and polarization would remain below the surface until the authoritarian regime starts to weaken.
36. See, e.g., MARK GRABER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark
Graber, Stanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018); STEPHEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL
ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE: WHAT HISTORY REVEALS ABOUT OUR FUTURE (2018); Gabor Halmai, Rights Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Democratic Backsliding and Human
Rights in Hungary, 14 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 97 (2020); Bojan Bugarič & Tom Ginsburg,
The Assault on Postcommunist Courts, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 72–75 (2016).
37. Counter examples of populism from the left include, in Latin America: Peron,
Chavez, AMLO (the Mexican president) and Bolivia (see correspondence with Sergio and
Tom Ginsburg).
38. See, e.g., Di Mauro & Verzichelli, supra note 25.
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In this Part, I will canvass the three models of the effects of polarization
on courts that are at the center of this Article, beginning with mirror polarization. I begin by describing the process of general polarization in the society
or societies in question and the reasons that led to it. Then, I move on to
describe how polarization affected courts in accordance with the models I
ascribe them.
A. Political Polarization in the United States
The U.S. is currently experiencing one of the highest levels of political
polarization in its history,39 and, according to some accounts, it is comparable today to the levels of polarization that predated the American Civil War.40
The U.S. is also said to have one of the highest levels of polarization comparatively, as shown in several comparative surveys that place it first in terms
of polarization levels.41 Most Americans today perceive polarization to be a
serious problem.42
Political polarization was not always high in the U.S. Surveys show low
levels of political polarization during the first decades following WWII and
through the 1970s. In fact, there was concern that the two parties were not

39. According to a Pew Research Center Survey in 2014, “[t]he overall share of Americans who express consistently conservative or consistently liberal opinions has doubled over
the past two decades from 10% to 21%. And ideological thinking is now much more closely
aligned with partisanship than in the past. As a result, ideological overlap between the two
parties has diminished: today, 92% of Republicans are to the right of the median Democrat,
and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican.” Political Polarization in the
American Public, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political- polarization-in-the-american-public/. The same survey found that
in 2014, 27% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans believed that the other party is “a threat
to the nation’s well-being” – double the numbers from 1994; See also Michael Dimock &
Richard Wike, America Is Exceptional in Its Political Divide, PEW TRUST MAG. (Mar. 29,
2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/trust/archive/winter-2021/america-is-exceptional-inits-political-divide (“Americans have rarely been as polarized as they are today.”).
40. See Paisley, supra note 5.
41. Dimock & Wike, supra note 39. (“This 47-percentage-point gap [between Republicans and Democrats] was the largest gap found between those who support the governing
party and those who do not [regarding its dealing with the COVID 19 pandemic] across 14
nations surveyed. Moreover, 77% of Americans said the country was now more divided than
before the outbreak, as compared with a median of 47% in the 13 other nations surveyed.”).
42. See, e.g., Chris Jackson, Neil Lloyd, James Diamond, & Jocelyn Duran, Most Americans Believe Political Hostility and Divisiveness Between Ordinary Americans Is a Serious
Problem, IPSOS (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/polarization-december-2021 (“Eight out of ten Americans believe political hostility and divisiveness in the
news media (81%), between politicians (81%), between ordinary Americans (81%), and on
social media (80%) is a serious problem.”).
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distinct enough, leaving the voter with no real choice between alternatives.43
What are the reasons for the sharp rise of polarization since the 1980s? First,
there are global reasons as mentioned earlier: global rising in economic gaps,
changes in the media, and a growing cosmopolitan elite. During the two decades following WWII, the U.S. enjoyed relatively low levels of economic
gaps. However, since the 1970s, and especially since the 1980s, there has
been an increased divergence in income and wealth between the lower and
the upper percentiles. The wealth of the upper classes grew exponentially
faster than the rest of the country, reaching staggering gaps on levels seen
only about a century ago.44 As mentioned earlier, high levels of economic
gaps enhance social alienation and polarization.
In the media sector, the appearance of cable TV in the U.S. in the 1980s
increased polarization, allowing for segmentation of the media market and
creating news outlets that catered to specific ideological audiences.45 This
phenomenon was later intensified with social media. Globalization and the
rising of the mobile and global elite enhanced alienation between city cosmopolitan centers and the rest of the country, and weakened a shared sense
of destiny and community, as was especially apparent in the 2016 elections.46
At least two other reasons can be tied to the U.S. First is its two-party
system which helps emphasize differences and requires each party to
43. See sources cited infra note 48.
44. Data from IRS Census shows that in 2016 13% of all income (after deducing tax)
comes from the top 1%. Income disparities resembles those that were not seen in the U.S.
since the 1920s. In terms of income gains over time, the same source shows that income gains
in the U.S. have been shared equally among the different percentiles from 1947 until around
1980. However, in the years 1980 to 2015 the income of top 1 precent has risen by 226%
while those of all other percentile groups have risen only between 47% and 85%. In terms of
wealth disparities are even more dramatic. According to the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, in 2016 39% of all the wealth in the U.S. was concentrated by the hands of
the 1st percentile. Chad Stone, Danilo Trisi, Arloc Sherman, & Jennifer Beltrán, A Guide to
Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guide-to-statisticson-historical-trends-in-income-inequality.
45. See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS
TEARING US APART (2008); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE
AND DIVIDE (2009); MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, HOW PARTISAN MEDIA POLARIZE AMERICA
(2013). Filipe Campante, Daniel Hojman, Media and Polarization: Evidence from the Introduction of Broadcast TV in the United States, 100 J. OF PUB. ECON. 79, 91 (2013) (“There has
been a steady increase in elite polarization in the U.S. since the 1970s, which has coincided
with at least three significant structural changes in the American media environment – the rise
of talk radio, the expansion of cable TV, and the Internet – all associated with content differentiation and market segmentation. Our approach suggests that these changes may have contributed to increase polarization.”).
46. See Dante J. Scala & Kenneth M. Johnson, Political Polarization along the RuralUrban Continuum? The Geography of the Presidential Vote, 2000–2016, 672 THE ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 162 (2017).
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underscore its distinctiveness.47 This tendency increased significiantly after
Southerners, who historically associated with the Democratic Party, began
moving to the Republican party in the 1960s, making the two parties much
more ideologically cohesive and distinct.48 Second, the high level of judicialization in the U.S. and the close relationship between law and politics has
likely contributed to the high polarization in the U.S. A judicial solution to a
political problem is usually more binary and less inclined to compromise
than political solutions, which increases polarization. The court’s controversial decisions in the 1970s, such as legalizing abortion and abolishing the
death penalty, likely contributed to polarization.49
B. Court Polarization in the United States Supreme Court
1. Polarization in Judicial Decision-Making
How did political polarization affect the U.S. Supreme Court? The political nature of the U.S. Supreme Court is nothing new and predates the current wave of political polarization; it was acknowledged as early as De
Tocqueville’s account of the American legal system in 1831.50 The unique
political nature of the U.S. Supreme Court was in part due to the power of

47. See Dimock & Wike, supra note 39 (“America’s relatively rigid, two-party electoral
system stands apart by collapsing a wide range of legitimate social and political debates into
a singular battle line that can make our differences appear even larger than they may actually
be.”).
48. See Ilyana Kuziemko & Ebonya Washington, Why Did the Democrats Lose the
South? Bringing New Data to an Old Debate, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 2830 (2018) (showing that
racial attitudes explained Southern whites’ exodus from the Democratic Party between the
1950s and the 1980s); See also Denise-Marie Ordway, ‘Racially conservative’ Attitudes Led
White Southerners to Leave Democratic Party, THE JOURNALIST’S RES. (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://journalistsresource.org/politics-and-government/racism-white-southerners-democrats-republicans/ (“Before 1950, nearly 80 percent of white adults who lived in the 11 states
of the former Confederacy identified as Democrats, compared with about 40 percent of white
adults in other parts of the country… By the early 2000s, about 30 percent of white adults in
the South and nationwide identified as Democrats.”).
49. Antonin Scalia wrote that Roe v. Wade (the U.S. Supreme Court decision that legalized abortion before the third trimester) “destroyed the compromises of the past [and] rendered compromise impossible for the future,” and that it “fanned into life an issue that has
inflamed our national politics in general.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern, Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995 (1992); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg similarly wrote that “Roe
… halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby, I believe,
prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Speaking in A Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L. REV. 1185, 1208 (1992).
50. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 78-85 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Adlard & Saunders 1883) (1835).
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judicial review that the Court had exercised since 1803, long before most
other courts followed suit.51
Ideological divisions in the Court are also not new. There have been
opposing ideological camps on the Court since the early 20th century. Examples include the division between the pro-Lochnerian and anti-Lochnerian
camps in the early 1900s52 and the Frankfurter and Black judicial camps over
judicial deference and interpretation in the 1950s.53 Additionally, the idea
that Supreme Court justices decide according to their political views dates
back to the 1950s when the first published study found a correlation between
the justices’ political views and their actual decisions.54
However, court politicization recently became progressively overt and
partisan, mirroring societal and political division with increasing precision
and consistency. While the Court was divided into camps in the past, those
divisions could not have been marked as neatly as partisan divisions between
two parties or even between conservative and liberal ideologies. For example, the famous Black versus Frankfurter debate was not along party divisions, but rather along methodological ones. Both “New Dealers,” Black and
Frankfurter, were nominated by the same Democrat, - President Roosevelt.55
In addition, although politics has measurably affected the justices’ decisions
since the 1950s, justices did not vote consistently according to the ideological line of the party of their nominating president. Often they switched sides
or developed independent jurisprudences that could be antithetical to that
party’s interests.56

51. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (determining the Court’s power of judicial review).
52. See generally Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991); MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1994).
53. See JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA (1989).
54. Classic empirical studies include: Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Jonathan D. Casper,
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50 (1976); and John
B. Gates, Partisan Realignment, Unconstitutional State Policies, and the U.S. Supreme Court,
1837–1964, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 259 (1987).
55. These two justices bitterly divided, and split the Court, on almost every issue possible
– from free speech and religious rights to formalism and textualism versus pragmatism and
balancing – but they were both elected as Roosevelt’s New Dealers. See SIMON, supra note
53.
56. See Brandon L. Bartels, The Sources and Consequences of Polarization,
in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL
POLARIZATION 171 (James Allen Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015) (arguing that before the early 2000s, justices’ positions on issues were not easily correlated with the views of
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However, increasingly since the 1980s, and most notably in the past two
decades, justices began deciding more predictably than ever before according to party line.57 As Richard Hasen writes, “today, party…provides a better
signal of ideological orientation than it has in generations… Justices are
more likely to be ideologically in line with the interests of their nominating
president’s party and less likely to drift ideologically (or “evolve”).”58 Empirical studies that follow the decision pattern of U.S. judges show that since
the 1980s, the distinctiveness of the conservative and liberal divide on the
Court has risen mirroring the political division in this country. Studies measuring court polarization show clear evidence of growing polarization on the
Court.59
It is true that even today, party alignment is never absolute or exhaustive, and one can still identify “swing votes.”60 But, such occurrences of

the party of the nominating president, and that the most robust center existed during the Burger
Court of the mid-to-late 1970s, consisting of arguably five swing justices).
57. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study
of Invalidating (And Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L. J. 737, 737-38
(2011) (“[T]he Justices’ votes to strike (and uphold) statutes seem to reflect their political
preferences toward the policy content of the law, and not an underlying preference for restraint
(or activism). In a nutshell, liberal Justices tend to invalidate conservative laws and conservative Justices, liberal laws.”); David Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of
the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/
(“From 1801 to 1940, less than 2 percent of the Supreme Court’s total rulings were resolved
by 5-to-4 decisions. Since then, more than 16 percent of the Court’s rulings have been decided
by “minimum-winning coalitions.” In the two most recent Courts, more than a fifth of all
rulings were decided by 5-to-4 votes … At least two-thirds of the 5-4 rulings during the Roberts Court have split along ideological lines.”).
58. See Richard Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 266,
267 (2019) (“The Martin-Quinn dynamic ideal point trends show a growing partisan divide
on the Supreme Court in recent decades, as seen in Figure 1. Prior to the 1990s, voting patterns
reveal substantial ideological overlap of justices appointed by Republicans and Democrats.
Following the retirement of John Paul Stevens in 2009, justices separated into two distinct
ideological voting blocks along party lines.”).
59. See Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, Estimating Judicial Ideology, 35 J. ECON. PERSP. 97
(2021) (Using Martin-Quinn scores for Supreme Court justices the authors argue that “[a]s
the salience of judicial ideology has grown in recent years, so has judicial polarization. Judges
appointed to the federal courts, from both parties, are increasingly being selected based on
their partisan bona fides and being drawn from the ideological extremes.”).
60. Chief Justice John Roberts, who was nominated by a Republican president, occasionally votes with the liberal block and against the conservative block. He is considered by some
to be the new “swing vote” on the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Tom McCarthy, John Roberts Is
Now Supreme Court’s Swing Vote – To Conservatives’ Disdain, THE GUARDIAN (June 30,
2020), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/jun/30/john-roberts-supreme-court-conservatives (noting that Justice Roberts has voted with the majority in “52 out of 52 recent cases”
and surveying the different rulings in which he joined the liberal justices on the court).
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independent voting are now rare, and these phenomena align with a decline
in the public legitimacy of the Supreme Court.61
2. Polarization in Nominations
The second manifestation of mirror polarization in the U.S. Supreme
Court is the nomination process. Again, the nomination process of justices
in the U.S. has always involved politics. The U.S. Constitution assigns nominations of federal judges to the president with the approval of the Senate.62
Furthermore, the nomination of judges is separate from the nomination of
other political offices, such as cabinet secretaries, ambassadors, and other
executive members - all going through the same process. As it has played
out over the years, the actual nomination process often involves a lot of politics — much of it overt and unabashed.63
However, despite the role of political considerations in nominations,
there was a culture of Senate approval and presidential nominations based
on merit. This culture persisted through the 1980s and early 90s with the
nominations of Antonin Scalia (1986) by a 98-0 majority in the Senate and
of Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1993) by a 96-3 vote. But as social and political
polarization grew, the nomination process began to mirror more precisely
the political division in society.64 Thus, in the confirmation of Chief Justice
61. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is the Supreme Court Facing a Legitimacy Crisis, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the -supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis (reviewing perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy); See
also Kuhn, supra note 57, (“Sixty-three percent of Americans said in autumn 2011 that they
have a “great deal” or a “fair amount” of faith in it. Yet that is the lowest share to express trust
in the judicial branch since 1976, when Gallup first asked the question.”).
62. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
63. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002) (documenting how presidents used the appointment of judges to advance their partisan agenda
during the 19th century); MELVIN UROFSKY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 389 (1994) (describing how one of the nominations to the Court, of John
Rutledge by George Washington, was not confirmed by the Senate, among others, because of
his position on a political issue.); Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of
Justice, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 5 (1993) (a political deal was also behind the nomination of
Earl Warren to Chief Justice, as Dwight Eisenhower promised Warren— then the popular
governor of California—the position of Justice if he would withdraw his candidacy in the
Republican Party primaries).
64. By many accounts, the turning point was the failed nomination of Robert Bork to the
U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Robert Bork’s Supreme Court Nomination
Changed Everything, Maybe Forever, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/12/19/167645600/robert-borks-supremecourt-nomination-changed-everything-maybeforever (quoting Tom Goldstein saying that
“Liberal groups turned around and blocked him [Bork] precisely because of those
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Roberts (2005), 22 votes were against (all Democrats) and 78 in favor, including only 22 Democrats. But as time passed, the confirmations were decided increasingly by a smaller margin, and fewer Democrats voted for Republican nominees and vice versa. Thus, Justice Kagan was confirmed in a
63 to 37 vote, Alito in a 53 to 42 vote, and Gorsuch in a 54 to 45 vote. In the
last nomination of Justice Barrett, party alignment was perfect, 52 to 48, and
not a single Democrat voted for her nomination by a Republican president.

65

Another factor in the nomination process is the search for “sure bets.”
This entails that a candidate be clearly aligned with the ideological line of
the party rather than opting for consensus or moderate figures, as was often
the case in previous years. Similarly, the extent of prying into the nominees’
past has dramatically increased to ensure they are associated with either a
liberal or a conservative agenda. As Hasen notes, “the days of ideological
surprise from appointed justices appear to be over.66 Today, presidents place
“near-exclusive focus on ideological compatibility and reliability.”67
3. Mirror Polarization Turning into One-Sided Polarization
The U.S. model is therefore aptly characterized as manifesting mirror
court polarization. The most recent nomination to the Supreme Court seems
to pose a challenge to this assertion. After the last nomination of Amy Coney
Barrett to the Supreme Court, there is now a conservative majority of 6 to 3
on the Court - the most significant clear majority of one camp in decades.
The recent landmark Dobbs decision,68 which has polarized the U.S., is an

[conservative] views. Their fight legitimized scorched-earth ideological wars over nominations at the Supreme Court, and to this day both sides remain completely convinced they were
right.”). Others trace the process earlier to the 1960s. See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY SEGAL,
ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 86 (2005).
65. Richard Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 262
(2019) (“The increased polarization in the United States among the political branches and
citizenry…affects the selection, work, perception, and relative power of state and federal
judges, including justices of the U.S. Supreme Court… In times of greater polarization, governors and presidents who nominate judges, legislators who confirm judges, and voters who
vote on judicial candidates are more apt to support or oppose judges on the basis of partisan
affiliation or cues.”).
66. Id. at 263.
67. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301 (2016) (showing the involvement of the Federalist society in the vetting process for Republican nominees).
68. See generally Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 191392, 597 U.S. (2022) (concluding that the U.S. Constitution does not confer a right to abortion).
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indication of conservative control on the Court and the inability of the liberal
minority to overcome it. More importantly, this advantage seems relatively
stable, threatening to undermine the mirror polarization model, and shifting
the U.S. towards another model - one-sided polarization.
Arguably, a shift has already occurred in the U.S., and it should no
longer be categorized as a mirror polarization model but as a one-sided polarization model. However, the shift is incomplete, and it is different in its
features compared to one-sided polarization in the Westminster World. First,
the shift to one-side polarization occurs only in judicial decision-making and
not in the realm of nomination. Nominations are expected to continue to be
polarized evenly between conservatives and liberals, mirroring the political
divide in society. Even so, while nomination battles reflect the political division in society, their outcome is expected to maintain the conservative advantage for the foreseeable future. As polarization heightens, conservative
judges can time their retirement to when there is a conservative president,
allowing them to maintain their advantage in the Court.
In addition, as the discussion in the next part will show, how the Westminster model systems developed into one-sided polarization is distinct from
the U.S. Supreme Court. The political one-sidedness on the courts of the
Westminster model developed independently of direct political influence. It
was subsequently, at least in principle, more stable and less contingent than
the U.S. current political advantage on the Court. The logic of the U.S. system of judicial nomination, as set in the U.S. Constitution, is that there be a
balance of power on the Court reflecting the turn of hands between governments on both sides of the political spectrum. Except for the heightened polarization that increased strategic behavior of judges in their retirement, it
was expected the system would correct itself over time. Thus, the U.S. system is described as a mirror polarization system, experiencing a glitch in the
system that could have self-corrected. In Westminster, the one-sidedness of
court polarization is not exactly a glitch but, as will be described, a result of
long-term and deep-seated developments. These developments concern possible solutions which would differ between the U.S. and Westminster model
countries, but this topic is outside the scope of this Article.

III. ONE-SIDED POLARIZATION – WESTMINSTER MODEL
COUNTRIES
Whereas the first model – mirror polarization – dealt with a court polarized into two political camps, mirroring the political polarization in society, the second model discussed in this section deals with courts where polarization favors one side. I identify this model with countries belonging to,
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or influenced by, the British parlimentary and judicial model – what is
termed “the Westminster Model.” As this part and the next apply to sets of
countries rather than only one, the discussion will necessarily be painted with
much broader strokes than Part I including unavoidable generalizations.
A. Political Polarization in the United Kingdom and Westminster
Model Countries
The term Westminster model alludes to a set of political arrangements
that originated in Britain and were left in place in some of its former colonies.69 Westminster model countries also share similar legal and judicial institutions – different from the U.S. and Continental Europe. The countries
that fall under this category and will be discussed here are the UK, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and Israel (henceforth “Westminster model countries.”) There are other countries that are also categorized as Westminster
model countries. These five countries were selected because they are among
the core countries of the Westminster model (especially the first four), but
also because they form a relatively coherent group in terms of judicial and
constitutional arrangements relevant to my discussion on court polarization.70 In terms of polarization, Westminster model countries vary in the intensity and reasoning for polarization. Still, in all of them, there are clear

69. These include, among others, an executive made of ministers that form a cabinet and
are also usually members of parliament; a prime minister as head of the executive; a coalition
government that needs the support of a majority in parliament; a formal head of the opposition; a symbolic head of state; a house speaker; and an independent and non-partisan civil
service. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 9 (2012) (outlining the classical
characterization of Westminster model democracies); Mark Bevir, The Westminster Model,
Governance and Judicial Reform, 61 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 559 (2008); AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE
COUNTRIES (1984); But see Meg Russell & Ruxandra Serban, The Muddle of the ‘Westminster
Model:’ A Concept Stretched Beyond Repair, 56 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 744 (2021); Matthew
Flinders et al., ’Stretched But Not Snapped:’ A Response to Russell and Serban on Retiring
the ‘Westminster Model,’ GOV’T & OPPOSITION, 353-369 (2022) (showing a recent debate as
to whether the concept has lost its meaning).
70. Other countries that are often listed as Westminster model countries are Ireland, India, Singapore, Hong Kong, and several former African and Oceanic colonies. However, surveys of Westminster model countries vary and often select only some countries for review
depending on the purpose of the review. See, e.g., Cheryl N. Collier & Tracey Raney, Understanding Sexism and Sexual Harassment in Politics: A Comparison of Westminster Parliaments in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada, 25 SOC. POL. 423 (2018). For the purposes of my review, the countries listed above present the most coherent set in terms of
judicial arrangements and political and constitutional structure. A few countries stand apart
from this list: Ireland because of its civil law tradition; India because it has had a constitution
with a bill of rights since its independence; and Singapore and Hong Kong because of their
democratic challenges.
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signs of increased political polarization in recent years.71 Compared to the
U.S., the level of polarization in these countries is lower, but considering that
the polarization process started later in Westminster model countries, it may
still rise in the future. Polarization in Westminster model countries is tied
with the global reasons discussed above: the rising gap between the rich and
poor,72 the increasing alienation between the global and mobile elite and the
local middle and lower classes,73 the rise in nationalism and localism, and
the changes in the media. Other reasons are more localized.
In the UK, the Brexit vote was among the chief reasons for rising polarization, as it divided British society almost in two. This division took
shape in extreme forms that demonized the other political side, and the political rift that evolved paralleled socio-economic and geographical divisions. Brexit, however, represented only one facet of a growing divide in
Britain over several other issues, such as the support of the EU project, immigration, and nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism.74 Another indication of polarization in the UK is political radicalization, expressed emphatically during
the Corbin era in the Labor party, accentuating the ideological gaps between
left and right.75 Surveys show a distinct rise in polarization in Britain since
the 2000s, reaching its peak in the 1980s.76
In Israel, the persona of former prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu
(Bibi), is at the center of fierce polarization that divides Israeli society into
two demarcated camps (“Bibists” and “anti-Bibists.”) This remains the case
even after Netanyahu has left office as prime minister. But, as with Brexit,
polarization emanates from long-dated wide divisions beginning in the 1980s

71. See source cited supra note 70.
72. See, e.g., Inglehart & Norris, supra note 26 (explaining polarization in the UK partly
by referring to economic gaps).
73. See, e.g., Cunningham & Savage, supra note 27.
74. See Shannon Schumacher, Brexit Divides the UK, But Partisanship and Ideology Are
Still Key Factors, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct 28, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/10/28/brexit-divides-the-uk-but-partisanship-and-ideology-are-still-key-factors/
(showing that “A question that has divided British politics–whether to leave the European
Union or remain part of it–aligns with attitudes toward the EU, immigration and the country’s
culture, but traditional cleavages along party lines and the left-right ideological spectrum still
exist on other topics, according to a new Pew Research Center survey.”).
75. See Eaton, supra note 2; Bill Blackwater, Morality and Left-Wing Politics: A Case
Study of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party, 24 RENEWAL: A J. OF SOC. DEMOCRACY 3 (2016)
(documenting how Jeremy Corbin’s Morality Politics increased extremism and polarization).
76. See Boxel et al., supra note 4, at 18 (showing a steep incline in affective polarization
levels in the UK from 2005 to 2020).
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correlated with socio-economic and religiosity differences. Surveys show
very high levels of polarization in Israel. 77
Polarization in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand is less distinct than
in the UK and Israel. Still, the issue receives increasing attention in politics
and the media, including the effects of polarized written, broadcast, and social media. In this respect, there is an increased resemblance to the U.S.78
B. The Westminster Model of a Professional Court
The legal and judicial systems of Westminster model countries share
several features in common. These countries operate within a common law
tradition; are headed by a supreme court or a court of a similar title, and have
no separate constitutional court; have a unique attorney general office; and
have similar administrative law traditions and processes for judicial nominations.79
Some of these features are also shared by the U.S. However, unlike the
U.S., before 1982, these countries did not have a constitutional bill of rights
that conferred the power of judicial review in human rights matters to their
highest court. Rather, there was a strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, meaning parliament (rather than the constitution) was viewed as the
highest source of authority in the country, and the Court was extremely reluctant to interfere with parliament’s autonomy.80
Systems operating under parliamentary sovereignty have also been
termed systems of political constitutionalism.81 In contrast to legal
77. See generally Lotem Bassan-Nygate & Chagai M. Weiss, It’s Us or Them: Partisan
Polarizarization in Israel and Beyond 3 MENA POL. NEWSL. 1 (2020).
78. Shannon Molloy, Australia Has Never Been More Divided on Social and Political
Issues. Are We Becoming the U.S.?, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 12, 2018),
https://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/australia-has-never-been-more-divided-onsocial-and-political-issues-are-we-becoming-the-us/newsstory/0891d42f4ce4e23c92aba59769a b60e9; See also Luke Mansillo & Nick Evershed, Australian Politics Becoming More Polarized, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/aug/07/australian-politics-becomingmore-polarised (“So, using the standard deviation as a measure of polarisation, we can see it
has increased over time.”).
79. See supra text accompanying note 70; See sources cited supra note 15.
80. See sources cited supra text note 69.
81. See Richard Bellamy, Legal Constitutionalism:From the Separation Of Powers to
Rights and Judicial Review, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (July 30, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/topic/constitutionalism/ (outlining the distinction and discussing some of the criticism of legal professionalism, including that it is less egalitarian than political constitutionalism: “whereas political constitutionalism responds to majority views for enhanced and more
equal public goods, legal constitutionalism has inhibited such reforms on grounds of their
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constitutionalism, in which the court is entrusted with the protection of constitutional principles and human rights, political constitutionalism means
that the political organs – parliament and the executive – protect and promote
constitutional principles and values (either written or unwritten), including
human rights. Australia and Canada (unlike New Zealand, the UK, and Israel) had constitutions even before 1982. They needed constitutions due to
their federal systems and needed rules to govern the relations between the
states and the union. However, their constitutions were (and still are in Australia) strictly “institutional” regulating the workings of the branches of government - and did not confer on the court any powers to intervene in sensitive
moral or policy issues relating to human rights.82
The inability to engage in judicial review (other than on institutional
matters) immunized apex courts in the Westminster model from political involvement, which explained their low political profile compared to the U.S.
Supreme Court.83 Thus, judges in these countries were rarely identified with
a particular ideology; no surveys were carried out to determine the ideological leanings of judges as in the U.S., and apex court judges were not wellknown public figures. Concurrently, the nomination of judges in Westminster model countries was not politicized. Although judges in these countries
(excluding Israel) were nominated by the executive, the actual nomination
process was never political in the partisan or ideological sense, but was based
primarily on professional merit and consultation with the legal profession.84
Another difference from the U.S. is that the legal profession in Britishbased systems was associated with conservativism and the high class, not
with a reformist or revolutionary force in society. This is unlike the U.S.,
where from the 1960s, courts were involved in dealing with social campaigns
interfering with individual property and other rights.”); Panu Minkkinen, Political Constitutionalism Versus Political Constitutional Theory: Law, Power, and Politics, 11 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 585 (2013) (distinguishing between political constitutionalism and consensusbased theories).
82. See DAVID ERDOS, DELEGATING RIGHTS PROTECTION: THE RISE OF BILLS OF RIGHTS
IN THE WESTMINSTER WORLD 10 (2010) (documenting the change in the Westminster World
that was, previously, devoid of Bills of Rights).
83. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 1346,
1349-50 (2006) (relying on this fact to criticize judicial review).
84. Judicial nomination is done by the Minister of Justice and Attorney General in Canada, by the cabinet in Australia and New Zealand, and by a committee of professionals (created in 2009 to select judges for the then newly formed Supreme Court; prior to this reform,
the Lord Chancellor, a cabinet member, made the nomination). Since 1953, judges are chosen
by a selection committee comprised of two ministers, two parliament members, three presiding Supreme Court judges, and two members of the bar. See supra text accompanying note
69; See also The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges Under Commonwealth Principles: A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice, BINGHAM CTR. FOR THE RULE OF L.
(2015).
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against inequality for African-Americans, women, the LGBTQ community,
the death penalty, and the prohibition on abortion. In Westminster model
countries, parliamentary committees discussed and determined such debates.85
C. Erosion of the Professional Model and One-Sided Polarization
The professional model of the judiciary described above began changing as early as the 1980s and heavily in the 1990s. The UK, New Zealand,
Australia, Canada, and Israel were not immune from the strong influences of
the culture of human rights, liberal constitutionalism, and the models of activist constitutional courts emanating from the U.S. and Continental Europe
in the second half of the 20th century.86 Compared to the innovative and morally assured spirit from the U.S. and the European courts, Westminster model
courts seemed dull and archaic. Both judges and politicians in the Westminster model could not detach themselves from this global trend toward human
rights protection and liberal constitutionalism. They gradually began eroding
the ethos of parliamentary sovereignty, political constitutionalism, and conservative non-political lawyers and judges.87
In terms of the judiciary, these changes are often surveyed under constitutional migration of ideas, transjudicial communications,88 or global constitutionalism, which reached their peak in the 1990s.89 In Westminster
model countries, they were manifested, among others, in adopting concepts
from EU human rights adjudication, such as proportionality, which, since the
1990s, became the lingua franca of global constitutionalism.90 For the UK,

85. See WALDRON, supra note 83 (advocating the UK model of parliamentary committees over the U.S. model of adjudicative decisions in major societal controversies).
86. See ERDOS, supra note 82.
87. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (documenting the global rise in the
power of judges, including in Westminster countries); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH
JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 1 (2000); Iddo Porat, Towering Judges and
Global Constitutionalism in TOWERING JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JUDGES 21, 25-26 (Rehan Abeyratne & Iddo Porat eds., 2021) (documenting the empowerment
of judges, including in Westminster model countries, especially in the 1990s and onwards).
88. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 101 (1994).
89. See generally David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1231-34 (2011).
90. See Bilika H. Simamba, Proportionality as a Constitutional Ground of Judicial Review With Special Reference to Human Rights, 16 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L. J. 125
(2016) (documenting the insertion of proportionality review in commonwealth jurisdictions).
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once it joined the EU in 1973, there was a direct influence of EU law on its
local legal sphere.91
In terms of political changes, these countries witnessed attempts to
adopt a constitutional bill of rights with judicial review. The first to directly
depart from political constitutionalism was Canada. In 1982, it adopted the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and gave its Supreme Court the power of
judicial review in human rights matters. This had a profound influence on all
other systems in this model. Thus, New Zealand adopted its Bill of Rights
Act in 1990; Israel adopted two human rights Basic Laws in 1992 – Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty;
the UK adopted the Human Rights Act in 1998; and in Australia, the State
of Victoria and the Australia Capitol Territory (Canberra) adopted their own
bills of rights – the Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities
Act 2008, and The Human Rights Act 2004.92 While the Constitution of Australia does not include a bill of rights, the High Court of Australia read into
Australia’s Constitution an “implied freedom of political communication” in
1992.93
The changes listed above had two profound effects on the interaction
between the courts and politics: first, the relevant courts became more activist and politically engaged, and second, they gradually became associated
with liberal viewpoints, resulting in one-side polarization.
Why this association with liberalism? First, ideologically, the political
left adheres to the liberal and cosmopolitan ideas manifested in global constitutionalism and bills of rights more so than the conservative and locally
oriented political right.94 Therefore, the human-rights-based empowerment
of the judiciary aligned ideologically more with the liberal than with
91. See, e.g., JAIME ARANCIBIA, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMERCIAL REGULATION 133-96
(2011); See Andrew Gamble, The Constitutional Revolution in the United Kingdom, 36
PUBLIUS 19, 25-26 (2006); Adrienne Stone, Proportionality and Its Alternatives, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TRIBUTES TO PROFESSOR LESLIE ZINES 170,
178-79 (John Griffiths & James Stellios eds., 2020) (documenting the use of proportionality
in Australian High Court adjudication).
92. See generally ERDOS supra note 82; Iddo Porat, The Platonic Conception of the Israeli Constitution in THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 268, 270,
275-78 (Rosalind Dixon & Adrienne Stone eds., 2017) (documenting the Israeli “constitutional revolution” by which the Israeli Supreme Court extended the two new Basic Laws of
1992 into a full constitution).
93. Australian Cap. Television v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45 (Austl.) (establishing
the “implied freedom of political discourse.”).
94. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 72 (2008) (analyzing the liberally associated spread
of proportionality as part of Global Constitutionalism); PORAT, supra note 87 (describing the
advent of Global Constitutionalism, including in Westminster model countries as part of a
liberal politics upsurge reaching its peak in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union).
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conservatives. Thus, it was liberal governments or parties that initiated the
enactment of bills of rights.95 Second, according to several scholars, the empowerment of the judiciary in Westminster model countries served the left
politically. According to David Erdos, the drive for bills of rights in Westminster model countries was partly motivated by a reaction to strong governments headed by the right and a means to curb their executive power.96
Ran Hirschl describes a similar process in Israel where the left, once it lost
its political hegemony to the right in the 1980s, looked for a way to retain its
political influence by empowering the judiciary and enhancing its liberal human rights mechanisms.97
The outcome was that the courts in the relevant countries (to varying
degrees) began being associated with the liberal left and criticized by the
political right for activism and overzealous liberalism. These countries
shifted from predominantly non-political and professional courts to greater
political involvement being generally associated more with liberal viewpoints – i.e., one sided-polarization. With increased political polarization,
this association became clearer, and right-wing accusations of the courts for
being too liberal,98 including attempts to reform and “rebalance” them increased. Thus, in recent years, there have been many reform attempts from

95. In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) was enacted by the Liberal
Party headed by Pierre Trudeaul; In New Zealand the Bill of Right Act 1990 was enacted by
the Labour government and was initiated by the Minister of Justice and also prime minister
for a year Geoffrey Palmer; in the UK the Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted by the Labour
government headed by Tony Blair; In Israel the two Basic Laws of 1992 were enacted by the
initiative of liberal left and center parties in a national coalition government of both left and
right wing parties headed by the right wing prime minister Yitzhak Shamir. In Victoria the
Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2008 was enacted by the Victoria
Labor government; The Human Rights Act 2004 of the Australian Capital Territory was enacted by Labor party government of the ACT. See generally ERDOS, supra note 82.
96. ERDOS, supra note 82 (“[Bills of rights were] prompted politically by a relatively
weak and backward‐looking ‘aversive’ reaction against perceived abuses of power under the
previous administration.”).
97. HIRSCHL, supra note 87; See also Ruth Gavison, Constitutions and Political Reconstruction? Israel’s Quest for a Constitution, 18 INT’L SOCIO. 53, 53 (2003) (arguing that the
Israeli Supreme Court’s expansive interpretation of the 1992 Basic Laws was a liberally
driven “constitutional process designed to arrest - rather than facilitate and reflect – [conservative] social, political and demographic changes.”).
98. See, e.g., Sam Fowles, Ministers’ Attacks on Judges Threaten UK Democracy, Warns
New Report, OPEN DEMOCRACY (June 8, 2022, 12:00 AM), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/boris-johnson-ministers-attack-judges-priti-patel-supreme-court/; For academia
driven conservative-oriented attacks in Australia, see Tom Campbell, Activism – Justice or
Treason, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 307, 313-14 (2003) (provocatively suggesting that activist judges
should be tried for treason); See Iddo Porat, Solving One-Side Polarization: Supreme Court
Polarization and Politicization in Israel and the U.S., 15 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 221, 241
(2021) (documenting the right-wing attacks against the Israeli Supreme Court).
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right-wing or conservative parties, especially in the UK and Israel.99 In Israel, there is clear statistical data indicating a one-sided polarization of the
court. As of 2019, support for the Israeli Supreme Court among left-wing
voters was at a rate of 88 percent, whereas among right-wing voters, it was
only 33 percent.100
In addition, in all three countries, a judicial nomination scheme, that
had been stable and undisputed for many years, has recently become contested to address or fend off increased court politicization.101 Australia and
New Zealand have experienced a conservative backlash against what was
considered a one-sided liberal court and the nomination of conservative
judges in the 1990s and early 2000s.102

99. Edward Malnick, Supreme Court to Be Overhauled to Curtail Its Constitutional Powers: Reforms Being Considered Include a New Name for the Body to Make Clear That It Is
Not a U.S.-Style Constitutional Court, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 14, 2020, 9:30 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/11/14/britains-supreme-court-faces-overhaulconcerns-us-style-election/; Ella Glover, Boris Johnson ‘Planning Reforms Which Would Let
Ministers Overrule Judicial Decisions’, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 6, 2021, 6:10 AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-reforms-judicial-reviewb1970290.html; Jessica Elgot, Johnson Publishes Plans to Regain Power From Courts and
MPs: Legislation Will Ban Courts From Ruling on Dissolution of Parliament and Allow PM
to Call Elections, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2020, 9:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/01/boris-johnson-publishes-plans-to-take-power-back-fromcourts-and-mps; See Porat, supra note 99 (documenting the reform initiatives from right-wing
parties and MP’s, such as a general override clause that would allow the parliament to override
court annulment of legislation).
100. TAMAR HERMANN, OR ANABI, WILLIAM CUBBISON & ELLA HELLER, THE ISRAELI
DEMOCRACY INDEX 48 (2019) (Isr.) (indicating that 59% of Israelis think that judges are affected in their decisions by their political inclinations to a great or considerable extent).
101. Owen Bowcott, Lady Hale Warns UK Not to Select Judges on Basis of Political
Views, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/dec/18/lady-hale-warns-uk-not-to-select-top-judges-on-basis-of-politicalviews (responding to conservative government suggestion to have hearings for Supreme Court
nominations in the UK); See Hearings for Prospective Supreme Court Justices to Be Broadcast Live, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 11 2022, 2:30 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/hearings-for-prospective-supreme- court-justices-to-be-broadcast-live/ (explaining Israel recently
held open hearing for judicial nominations have been decided on, another step in an ongoing
debate over judicial nominations); See also Sa’ar pans Opposition Bill ‘Politicizing’ Selection
of Supreme Court Judges, TIMES OF ISRAEL (June 13, 2022, 4:54 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/ saar-pans-opposition-bill-politicizing-selection-of-supreme-court-judges/ (describing current Minister of Justice’s rejection of right-wing opposition bill regarding the selection of judges to the Supreme Court).
102. See ERDOS, supra note 82.
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D. One-Sided Polarization and Political Polarization
The shifts in the professional model of the judiciary and the court’s association with the liberal left began in the 1980s and 1990s when levels of
political polarization in the relevant countries were still relatively low. One
may argue that one-sided polarization is not an accurate term when applied
to Westminster countries since the changes described above were not caused
by polarization. This is, however, only partly correct. It is true that, unlike in
the U.S., there is no one-directional causal relationship between the increased political polarization and the polarization of the court. However, one
can say that the two phenomena – court polarization and the intensification
of political polarization – are interrelated and result from similar processes.
First, as mentioned before, the more political polarization increased, the
greater court identification with one viewpoint became distinct, which drew
the court directly into the political debate. Thus, the highly polarizing Brexit
debate identified the UK Supreme Court as an activist, threatening conservatives rather than liberals. Secondly, the same set of reasons that created onesided court polarization was later responsible for the development of political polarization in Westminster model countries. As mentioned above, polarization is related to a backlash against the increased political power and
perceived hegemony of the liberal and cosmopolitan elite. The same increase
in the political power of the liberal cosmopolitan elite is also related to the
bills of rights initiatives in the Westminster model countries. Finally, the
court itself may be a contributing factor to political polarization, as its increased involvement in political affairs can increase political polarization,
like in the U.S.
E. One-Sided Polarization Turning into Mirror Polarization
In several of the relevant countries, there are some indications that the
one-sided polarization model might be shifting gradually into a mirror polarization model. As conservative and right-wing parties realize that the court
is becoming more of a central political player and generally inclined to the
progressive and liberal side of the political map, they wish to interfere and
change this process. Hence, in several of the Westminster model countries,
one sees attempts from the right to curb the power of the court, but also, more
interestingly, to put in place conservative judges who would rebalance the
court. Thus, judicial nominations in Westminster model countries become
more political, as in the U.S., and one can distinguish between conservative
and liberal judges within the judiciary as in the U.S. In Canada, the UK, and
Israel, it is common to refer to some judges as liberal or conservative (not
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only as activist or deferential), which was almost unthinkable in these jurisdictions only two decades ago.103
Some Westminster model countries might be heading into an American-model mirror-polarization. It should be noted that those systems are still
very different from the U.S. in levels of court polarization. This is partially
because the legal culture in Westminster model countries is still embedded
in the professional model, making it much harder to admit all-out political
nomination and decision-making. But the pressures toward such a model
seem to mount as the political stakes go up. In Israel, for example, where
court polarization is very high, one might argue that U.S.-style mirror polarization has already arrived.104

IV. CRACKS IN THE CONSENSUS-BASED MODEL
We move now from the U.S. and Westminster model countries, which
represented a clear opposition between the two models - mirror polarization
and one-sided polarization - to Continental Europe and a more tenuous relationship between the judiciary and polarization. There are two main relevant
differences between Continental Europe and both the U.S. and the Westminster model systems: one relating to the nature of the political party system
and the other to the structure of the apex court and its relation to politics. I
turn to these two differences to provide background about the developments
in society and the courts following polarization.

103. Sean Fine, Canada’s Supreme Court is Off-Balance as ‘Large and Liberal’ Consensus on the Charter Falls Apart, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Jan. 15, 2022), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canadas-supreme-court-is-off-balance-as-large-and-liberal-consensus-on/ (“For the first time, the Supreme Court had split almost entirely by party of
appointment – just like its U.S. counterpart. Judges chosen by Conservative prime minister
Stephen Harper were on one side, and judges named by Liberal prime ministers on the other,
with a lone exception on each side.”); Alex Dean, The Government Wanted to Rein in the
Supreme Court. Now It May Not Need to, THE PROSPECT MAG. (Oct. 16, 2021),
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/the-government-wanted-to-rein-in-the-supreme-court-now-it-may-not-need-to-hale-reed-prorogation (describing an increased cleavage in the UK Supreme Court between conservative and liberal judges, and the general tendency of the court to become more conservative); THE ECONOMIST, Britain’s Supreme Court
Takes a Conservative Turn: It Rejects More Human-Rights Claims and Sides with Public
Bodies More Often (June 2, 2022), https://www.economist.com/britain/2022/ 06/02/britainssupreme-court-takes-a-conservative-turn (documenting the decline in success rates of petitions against the government in the UK Supreme Court).
104. Britain’s Supreme Court Takes a Conservative Turn: It Rejects More Human-Rights
Claims and Sides with Public Bodies More Often, THE ECONOMIST (June 2, 2022, 10:00 AM),
https://www.economist.com/britain/2022/06/02/britains-supreme-court-takes-a-conservative-turn (documenting the decline in success rates of petitions against the government in the
UK Supreme Court).
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A. Two Differences Between United States/ United KingdomBased Systems and Continental Europe
As to the political party system, Britain and the U.S. have been characterized for over two centuries by politics of two major parties, alternating in
taking power and struggling for domination in a democratic system. On the
other hand, Continental Europe was characterized by more fragile democratic systems and much younger democracies. In most of Continental Europe, the two-party system did not develop in the same manner. Instead,
these countries developed a system based on a big center (center right or
center left), accompanied by fringe parties, which continued to characterize
Europe after democracy was finally firmly established following WWII.105
This structure also reflected a difference in political culture. The AngloAmerican world – the U.S. in particular - was built on a political culture of
conflict and pluralism, where the outcome of the democratic process reflects
the power struggle between two big parties. The U.S. also reflected this in
its constitutional system that is based on checks and balances, where not only
parties were pitted one against the other, but also the different branches of
government - the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court. On the other
hand, the political culture in Europe, as manifested in Germany, was an organic conception of the polity based on cooperation around a shared set of
values instead of pluralism and conflict.106
The effects of WWII also contributed to the development of a big center
in European countries and a consensus-based conception of the polity. A
crucial sign of the upcoming breakdown of German democracy was the fact
that, in the 1932 July elections of the Weimer republic, the Social Democratic center party received only 21.6%, while the extreme non-liberal parties
- the Nazi Party from the right and the Communist Party from the left - received 37% and 14%, respectively, amounting to more than 51% of the total
vote.107 The lesson from the devastating effects of this political extremism

105. See generally MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, MIXEDMEMBER ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS? (2003) (analyzing advantages
and disadvantages of the two-party and the multi-party system to suggest a mixed model);
DAVID J. SAMUELS & MATTHEW SHUGART, PRESIDENTS, PARTIES, AND PRIME MINISTERS:
HOW THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AFFECTS PARTY ORGANIZATION AND BEHAVIOR (2010)
(analyzing variation in the relationships among presidents, parties, and prime ministers across
the world’s democracies).
106. See MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURE, 44-63 (2013) (conflating the political culture of the U.S. and Europe to explain
constitutional differences).
107. See Jerome Kerwin, The German Reichstag Elections of July 31, 1932, 26 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 921 (2013).

34

HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

Vol. 46:1

was the formation of political moderation and a strong center capable of outlawing extreme non-democratic and non-liberal parties through the doctrine
of militant democracy.
The second and related main difference between the Anglo-American
world and Continental Europe relates to the structure of the apex court and
its relation to politics. As described earlier, the U.S. and British courts assumed either one of two positions vis-a-vis the political system: either reflecting some degree of political struggle - the U.S. model; or separating itself completely from politics - the British model (before the 1980s). In Post
WWII Europe, a third model evolved - a politically oriented but consensually
based court. This was the model around which the constitutional courts in
Europe were created.108
European constitutional courts combine political orientation with legitimation based on objectivity and professionalism. On the one hand, they are
conceived as political organs. Thus, judges on constitutional courts are selected, in most European countries, by a combination of parliamentary and
executive votes. In practice, judicial slots are often allocated to political parties according to their size.109 On the other hand, these courts are not conceived of as political in the ideological and conflictual sense, and are not
expected to take part in political or ideological struggles. They are conceived
of as objective and impartial, including a very high level of consensus around
them across all parts of the political spectrum. This was achieved largely
because of a political culture that is based on shared values and a strong center. The judges manifested center values in their rulings, providing an objective shape in concrete cases.110
B. Polarization and Cracks in the Center and Consensus-Based
Model
As mentioned in Part I, gradually, the center and consensus-based political model started to erode, and forces of polarization arose in European
politics. In Part I, I described how the passing of time from the trauma of
WWII, coupled with historical developments such as the rise of immigration,
108. See generally ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000) (documenting the development of the constitutional courts in Europe and the increase in their political power).
109. See id. at 32-38.
110. See JACCO BOMHOFF, BALANCING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE ORIGINS AND
MEANINGS OF POSTWAR LEGAL DISCOURSE, at 77 (2003) (describing the legal culture in Germany in particular that views judiciaries as objective even when applying open-ended doctrines such as balancing and proportionality, through the idea of “objective value order.”).
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economic inequality, and global terrorism, allowed for the resurfacing of polarizing forces that were previously suppressed under the new liberal order.
The politics of the first two decades of the 21st century reflected these
changes, with a dramatic rise in extreme parties, mainly from the right, and
with a legitimacy crisis of the entire project of the new liberal Europe, especially of the European Union that embodies it.111
The effects of polarization did not leave the courts unaffected. However, such effects are far more nuanced and recent in Continental European
Courts than in the U.S. and UK-based courts. The main effect of polarization
on European constitutional courts is the creation of new tensions around the
previously consensus-based nomination process of judges. Therefore, I
termed the court polarization model in Continental Europe, “cracks in consensus based-nominations.” Two countries show signs of this process – Switzerland and Germany.
In Switzerland, judicial nominations are conducted through a political
process. A proposal to move from a political nomination to a professional
one via a professional committee was defeated in 2001. Judges are selected
by a simple majority vote of the combined two houses of parliament. In effect, since the 1950s, nominations were based on a political consensus model
in which each of the three big parties nominated judges in proportion to each
party’s size in parliament. Since the 1950s, this model has worked relatively
well, with the number of judges on the Federal Supreme Court nominated by
each party reflecting the relative size of the parties.112
Referring to the previous discussion, one might wonder whether this
arrangement fits the description of a mirror polarization model. It does not
because it does not bear any relation to social and political polarization, but
is based on the opposing idea of consensus. There is indeed a mirroring of
the political structure regarding slots on the constitutional courts, but the
judges nominated are not expected to act in accordance with the party ideology that nominated them. In other words, there is no mirroring of political
polarization pertaining to decision-making. In addition, there is no mirror
polarization in the nomination process, as the process is not conflictual or
divisive but consensual. How such a system can exist – a system in which
parties nominate judges but the judges are not political - might be a mystery
for an Anglo-American skeptical and cynical audience. Such a system, however, does work – or, more precisely, it worked until the effects of
111. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; See also CHRISTIAN SCHWEIGER,
EXPLORING THE EU’S LEGITIMACY CRISIS: THE DARK HEART OF EUROPE (2016) (documenting the legitimacy crisis of the European Union since the economic crisis of 2007-08).
112. See Adrian Vatter, Switzerland on the Road from a Consociational to a Centrifugal
Democracy?, 22 SWISS POL. SCI. REV., at 59 (2016).
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polarization reached Continental Europe and drove the nomination process,
according to Vatter, from a “consensus based model to a battleground around
the nomination process.”113
The Swiss political party map throughout most of the second half of the
20th century was made of three center-based political parties. Since the
1990s, however, a fourth party, the fringe right-wing party, Swiss people’s
Party (SVP), began a dramatic rise in popularity and share in parliament.
Over time, the SVP surpassed all other parties and became the largest party
in the Swiss parliament. This required a reshuffling of the balance of power
on the Court and brought about battles around nominations in what was previously a quiet, consensus-based nomination process. Because the oncefringe party grew dramatically in power, a situation arose where the center
parties remained overrepresented in the Court, and the SVP claimed its proportional share. It is unclear whether this nomination battleground will remain or settle down as the SVP reaches its proportionate share of judges on
the Court. Still, it attests to the undoing of a previously consensus-based status quo.114
In Germany, a similar process has occured, but only at the state level
and not at the federal level. The very high vote threshold of 5% in German
federal elections does not allow small and extreme right-wing pirates to enter
the German parliament – the Bundestag. In the 2017 elections, the extreme
right-wing Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) received almost 5% of the
vote but that was not enough to enter the Bundestag. However, AfD did win
elections at the state level, and similar to Switzerland, state-level elections
became a battleground for the nomination of judges. For instance, when the
AfD nominated Sabine Reger as a judge at the constitutional court of BadenWürttemberg in 2018, the big parties were in a dilemma. On the one hand,
they did not want to legitimize a judge belonging to such an extreme rightwing party. On the other hand, opposing a judge of a party that was elected
democratically could be viewed as undemocratic and sidestepping political
opponents. The center parties ended up cooperating with the nomination of
Reger, but it remains to be seen how these tensions evolve and whether similar high-stakes dilemmas occur in the future.

113. See id.
114. See Rahel Freiburghaus & Adrian Vatter, The Political Side of Consociationalism
Reconsidered: Switzerland between a Polarized Parliament and Delicate Government Collegiality, 25 SWISS POL. SCI. REV., at 357 (2019).
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CONCLUSION
Constitutional and supreme courts worldwide are experiencing strong
strains and new challenges from the forces of political polarization ravaging
many polities. However, not all jurisdictions react the same way to the pressures of polarization. This Article aimed to give a general framework and
typology for the different ways different courts are affected by and react to
political polarization. Doing so it has found surprising similarities between
jurisdictions, as well as important distinctions. It has also shown that courts
and judiciaries are not stable but are in a state of flux, shifting between one
model to another.
This Article showed that the U.S. is currently shifting from a mirror
polarization to a one-sided polarization model. First, I demonstrated how political polarization in the makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court created a mirror
polarization model in the U.S. But following the latest nomination to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and manifested by the polarizing Dobbs decision, a stable
majority of conservatives on the Court threaten to undermine not only this
model but moves the U.S. into a one-sided polarization model.
In Westminster-model countries, courts that used to be associated with
the liberal left (one-sided polarization) are being polarized into an Americanstyle, liberal versus conservative fight (mirror polarization). The only system
that shows relative immunity and stability is the Continental European
model, but it also faces challenges owing to the upsurge of polarization.
If there is one lesson to be drawn from this study, it is that “one-sided
polarization” – the court identifying with one side of the political map - is
not a stable situation. Once courts in the Westminster World became associated with the liberal left, pressure from the right inevitably amounted, driving
those courts to change. The U.S. managed to sustain its politically associated
judiciary, even as adjudication became increasingly partisan because the
Court was not completely one-sided. Now that it is, it is hard to see how this
could be a stable situation. Europe might give us a clue as to how to combine
political courts with consensus building. But as Europe is facing new challenges, and as institutional differences from both the U.S. and Westminster
model countries are great, much more work is needed for us to draw on its
experience to benefit either of these two jurisdictions.
The Article, therefore, does not provide an answer but tries to provide
a basis for the more challenging task to come – addressing court polarization
and stabilizing the current struggling judiciaries around the world.
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